

To

Resume of lecture notes of Methodologie Generale given by M. Charles De Koninck. 1938-39:

I. Knowledge in general, which consists in becoming another as other. That is a definition of the objectivity which at the same time manifests what subjectivity is. A being which is purely and simply subject is incapable of going out from itself, is closed to all that which is exterior to it as it is closed for itself. It does not know itself, for if it did it would know itself as other (in the cognitive sense). Other means simply object.

II. Intellectual knowledge. This is necessary to understand if we are to know what science is. This knowledge extends to all things absolutely. No need for demonstration; merely a little dialectics to cause the fact to be observed. The soul is in a certain manner all things. The sensitive soul of the animals is in a sense all sensibles, but in the case of the intellectual soul, it is a question of all things in a completely rigorous sense. "Nam unaquaque intellectualis substantia est quodammodo omnia, in quantum totius entis comprehensiva est suo intellectu" III CG 112.

How do we know we know all things? It is impossible to pose the question without at the same time knowing all things. How could the question arise unless you knew all things? The reply is implied in the question. One cannot know that he does not know all without knowing all. To the question: what is the extent of our intelligence, the reply, in all frankness, is that we know all, and this without exception. What exception can be imagined? The exception is again among the things which are. All things, that is, all which is not nothing, all which is not impossible. Hence we arrive at the paradox that it is impossible to know nothing sans knowing everything, or rather that it is impossible to know that one knows nothing without knowing everything. This is a paradoxical idea: one can know all and know nothing in a certain manner. This manifests the nature of our intelligence, for although it extends to all things, yet considered in itself it is in potency. All this is implied in the principle of contradiction, which is, that a thing cannot be and not be at the same time and in the same respect, and since this principle is first, without which nothing else can be known, it is impossible that we know something without knowing everything, since everything is implied in this principle. The principle applies to everything which is possible.

Therefore, there is an absolute co-extensivity between being and non-being, being and the impossible, that is, that non-being is absolutely outside being. Being is not opposed to non-being in a certain respect, but it is entirely opposed to it, the impossible is excluded absolutely from being. As this opposition between being and non-being is absolute, and absolutely universal, we have an opposition of contradiction.

C O P Y

If there ~~is~~ on one hand coextensiveness between being and non-being, there is on the other coextensiveness between being and thought, and that is what I say when I say I know all things. I mean that my intelligence extends to being, to anything insofar as it is. And there exists also a coextensiveness between thought and non-being, that is, I exclude universally non-being from being. There is, then, thought, being, and non-being: the two exclude the one the other and both are implied in thought. The being in question is object of thought insofar as being, as ens naturae. By that which is understood not only that which in fact exists, but also that which can exist for this is implied in that which is; not necessarily in a subjective fashion. There is that in being which ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ is necessary to lead the possible into actuality, and in this respect the possible is implied in being. To say it in a negative way: being is the impossibility of non-being; non-being being the impossibility of being.

A characteristic of nonbeing is that it is at once object of thought and impossibility to be. Nonbeing cannot be an object as a thing. Yet we say nonbeing, we say impossible, so it can be an object of thought. If one could not think it, it would be absurd to say nonbeing, that this is impossible, it would be absurd to state the principle of contradiction. Nonbeing is only an object of reason, it is a being of reason.. Again something is shown of the nature of our intelligence: when it is deprived of being as an object, it is a tabula rasa. In other words, I know nonbeing as impossibility of being at the same time as object of thought alone. Thought deprived of being is in a void. Therefore our pure thought considered in itself, abstracting from being, is an absolute vacuum. Consequently, the dependence of our intelligence vis-a-vis being is total. Hence our intelligence sees in the first principle both absolute universality of being and at the same time its own pure potentiality. That is why we must necessarily reduce any critique of knowledge to the first principle. The intelligence has not on the one hand being as object and on the other nonbeing as object, as if the two were independent of one another.

The being of reason is in no wise independent of being; the being of reason is in the negation of being and conditioned by being; which is to say that one cannot have the being of reason as object of thought without having at the same time, and as conditioning the being of reason, the being of nature, ens naturae. This is impossible, the being of reason being the negation of being; we must have something to deny, and we cannot deny a negation. One negates of that which is that which is not. Nonbeing as object is founded on being and founded in being with regard to knowledge. And the being of reason is not so opposed to being and founded that it might be independent of being as ~~xxxx~~ object; but even as object it is thought ad instar entis. Being, on the contrary, is not founded on its negation. From these considerations we can draw the three following distinctions.

C O P Y

(a) Distinction between being of reason and ens naturae. Understanding by real being that which is in fact and that which is possible too. This distinction is the foundation for the

(b) Distinction between the real and logical orders. This is most important; you have only to confuse these two orders to become a communist. The confusion begins there; once one admits this all hell breaks loose.

(b) Distinction between being object and pure thought.

(c) We can see the anteriority of the problem of being and nonbeing to that of the true and the false.

We may note that the moderns never take the trouble to examine principles in this manner. Their big mistake consists in this, that they have never gotten to the first principle; the principle of contradiction is never elevated beyond contrariety. Philosophers speak to us often of pure thought, of the pure consciousness as opposed to the object in such a fashion that pure thought ought first of all grasp itself and then worry about the object, and then the problem of objectivity is posed. Pure thought is spoken of: I think that I think; when I do this, am I not faced with pure thought? But, when I think that I think, I think myself as an object, and I know thought in thinking of something else, but when I grasp thought, I grasp it as object and under this respect it is opposed to the potentiality of my thought, of my intelligence. What can one conclude from this dangerous position? To give as object their own pure thought, and then is sought contact with an object. In fact, one seeks to deduce from the being of reason, taken first, real being; thus there is sought coextensiveness between this pure thought deprived of an object, and they wish that this thought taken formally as pure, as devoid of object, attain the object; they wish that thought remain void in attaining an object. Consequently, they wish to draw the object from their own vacuity. (What we call pure thought is absolutely other: God who being pure act is pure thought.)

III. Objectivity of Knowledge. Knowledge of a thing is defined by its objectivity. For a sapiens, it would be absurd to inquire whether knowledge is objective. Since the definition of knowledge implies its objectivity: the other insofar as other - hence one is the other objectively. If one is not the other insofar as other, one does not know; that is, one is not in act with the other, but simply with oneself, in pure subjectivity. Subjectivity is opposed to knowledge, and in the measure that there is subjectivity there is not knowledge. Subjective knowledge is a contradiction in terms. Note that we have not yet spoken of the true and the false. We are for the moment placing ourselves in the point of view of knowledge as such, and from this point of view a subjective knowledge is a contradiction in terms; a being properly and simply subjective, and consequently a being which

C O P Y

cannot have an object, can't have either another being nor itself as object. In philosophy, subjectivity is synonymous with potentiality. What is as subject is potential and consequently knowledge will be objective in the measure that it does not connote potentiality. That is why Aristotle concludes, immediately after having demonstrated that there exists a pure act, that this pure act is an intelligence which thinks itself. Note that the divine knowledge is so objective that one can't say of God that He is a subject. So also one cannot say of being that it might be a subject. Of what would it be the subject? Of nothing, which is impossible. Thus the limitation which is imposed on knowledge because of subjectivity does not entail that the knowledge which has these beings be subjective. Not at all; it means simply that knowledge will be limited from the point of view of ~~xxx~~ objectivity, which is not the same thing. Knowledge can be less objective without being subjective. Therefore, we must say that knowledge of these beings is limited by their subjectivity.

We speak of intellectual knowledge which extends to all things even when it extends to practically nothing, when it is extremely limited it remains nonetheless unlimited. So it is immediately necessary to distinguish the respect in which one can see this universality, this extension and intension of the object of the intelligence.

Evidently, it is going to be necessary to attribute the restriction which subjectivity imposes on us, or rather it is going to be necessary to attribute its limitation to subjectivity. The intelligence is, then, something extremely paradoxical; it extends to all even when it is capable of a certain limitation. We must be happy with this, for were it not so, you would not be possible; if a limited intelligence were not possible, the intellectual creature would not be possible.

God can exhaust any object; there is no subject with regard to his knowledge, subject being the impenetrable. We share something of that objectivity. Being is opposed to nothing as to the impossible. Being is that which is more universal and since we attain being as such, we attain in a certain manner everything, that is, that the all is given to us as the other, all things are known as others, as objects, and since this embraces all there will be no subject which is not in this all as object. In this respect our knowledge extends to all things, that is, being is purely and simply object. Being cannot be subject. When we consider being as being, outside of being there is only nothing. Being cannot be receive received, there is only nothing which could receive it and nothing is impossible. Being envisaged purely as such, is not pure act and yet being is said of pure act, and you see at once that if we thought being as being in a subject and if being taken as such implied a subject, we would not be able to know pure act, which we know as being outside of every subject, as being pure actuality, as implying no potentiality. If being itself were not conceived as pure

C O P Y

object, we would not be able to know God as being pure object, we could not even conceive the possibility of pure act.

The difference between sensible and intellectual knowledge can be seen. Sensible knowledge is limited to a certain genus: sensibilia. It is essential to add that the intelligence extends itself to all things quodammodo. And precisely in this respect intellectual knowledge is radically objective, its proper object implies no subjectivity. But in the measure that knowledge of being does not make explicitly known all that is implied in being, unless of course insofar as it is opposed to nothing, the objectivity of this knowledge will be limited in this respect.

How can our knowledge imply infinity in one respect and limitation under another? This paradox is based on the paradox which is the principle of contradiction: the principle which tells us that we know all things, and at the same time tells us that we cannot know all things, giving us at the same time nothing as object.

In other terms, the principle of contradiction apprises us that we cannot attain being in a purely and simply affirmative fashion; we are obliged at the same time to posit that which is the most absolutely opposed to being, nothing, that is, the impossible. We think being in opposing it to nothing; we grasp it in an opposition of contradiction. But the principle of contradiction excludes nothing from being, but this exclusion does not exclude our potentiality vis a vis being, that is that being object remains opposed to us and more precisely to the potentiality of our intelligence, a potentiality is manifested in the fact that we have to posit nothing, the impossible.

~~If we could grasp being directly in a pure affirmation, we would have an exhaustive knowledge of being in all respects; which is to say that if this knowledge were purely and simply affirmative, we would no longer be subjects, we would be pure acts, our knowledge would be a pure affirmation of that which is. Our intelligence would be in immediate and intuitive contact with the entirety of being, all of which it comprehended and this in an explicit fashion.~~

The limitation of the objectivity of our knowledge (intellectual) is explained consequently not by the limitation of the object - the knowledge of limited things is infinitely objective - but by the limitation, the potentiality of our intelligence; the limit imposed in no wise comes from the object, but exclusively and formally from the subject of knowledge.

From all this we can draw two conclusions. First, the impossibility of agnosticism; and then the possibility of science. Agnosticism does not only pretend that we are incapable of attaining in an objective fashion that which surpasses the order of reality with which we are in contact immediately and know directly (in thomistic terms we would say that the agnostics pretend that we can only attain the order of material quiddities) and they do not only pre-

C O P Y

tend that we can have no certitude of the existence and the nature of God for example; all that is secondary, those are but the conclusions of agnosticism. At bottom it rejects the transcendental value of the principle of contradiction.

Agnosticism supposes in fact a radical dualism in being; that is it pretends that the first principle of being and of knowledge does not extend to the things which we know, directly; material beings; that this principle can't be applied in an order which transcends that which we know directly.

It is the same as the statement that it is manifestly possible that there exist an order where what would be contradictory here would be possible. There could exist several categories so opposed that they would be contradictory to each other in the same respect.

Hence the universality of the principle of contradiction is denied by agnosticism which one should not attack by demonstrating the existence of God, for this would be useless. It must be refuted by being attacked with the doctrine it sustains with regard to the first principle. For agnosticism, the first principle is applicable to but one genus of being; another genus is possible where this principle does not apply. Which supposes that we know only the being of things which we know directly, that we know the being of these things in a fashion purely and simply affirmative, whereas the things which surpass our experience we know only in a purely negative fashion, so negative that we could not say: they are. And if we might say they are, that would mean something completely different from saying of something here below: these things are. In other words the first principle being purely and simply affirmative, we could not apply it to things other than those which fall directly in our experience, and all which positively surpasses this experience surpasses at the same time the first principle.

For us the first principle expresses being by means of a negation. It implies both something positive and something negative; both being and the contradictory of being. It is not purely and simply affirmative; it cannot be put thus: that which is, is - that which is not, is not - as a pure affirmation. When we say the being of a material thing, this being is opposed simply to the impossible; and this being is in no wise opposed to the immaterial. Why? Because we consider the material thing not as material, but as being, simply. In fact if an immaterial thing is possible, it is evident, it is immediately evident that it is in being.

So, far from being modest, the agnostic is obliged to adopt a sceptic position with regard to all that which surpasses the order of material things. And that for the simple reason that he has given to the first principle a purely affirmative signification, for having maintained that the first principle is the principle of identity.

C O P Y

It is true that we can say "this thing is", and that this is a pure affirmation, but when I say that a thing is I already imply being as predicate. When I consider it in itself it does not imply the restriction that it has when I apply it to this thing here. I suppose already the first principle when I say this thing is; I suppose that the sense of being is already completely explicated, so I can very well apply it in a purely and simply affirmative fashion to the material things which surround me and which I know directly. In this respect there can be identity, but it is not thus that I take being when I consider it as such. If the first principle depends entirely on the application I make of it, to the material things which surround me immediately, and this principle is first, then I exclude by that very fact any possibility of contact with an order which surpasses the order to which I apply it immediately. I would suppress at the outset any being which surpasses that of my immediate experience; and if I cannot attain a transcendent order the reason is that my first principle was not first. I must pose another and what I took for the first principle is derived and secondary. When I say that the principle of identity is the first principle I am obliged to deny transcendence and am led to agnosticism. Not that those who maintain the principle of identity is first are agnostics but if one could think all one could say this would be the case, but one can say many things which are impossible to thought.

The primacy of the principle of identity is not only at the base of agnosticism; this primacy which is expressed in words to which nothing in thought responds, this primacy can give rise also to ontologism: a doctrine which goes to say that even God is the proportioned object of our intelligence and that we see all things in God a little like in the beatific vision.

To accord primacy to the principle of identity would oblige us to say that we are pure acts, that we know all things intuitively, that we exhaust the entirety of being in an explicit fashion. For if we attain it in a pure affirmation this would be because it is whole and entire immediately present; knowledge of being would be a pure intuition which implies consequently in an absolutely explicit manner all that being contains, all that is an act.

Agnosticism (which removes us absolutely from pure act) and ontologism (which brings us too close to it) confuse the order of knowledge with the order of being, the logical order with the real order.

They are both extremely difficult to refute because it is necessary to lead their partisans to the first principle which is infinitely difficult, which is almost never achieved in philosophical discussions.

C O P Y

Confusion of real and logical orders. Although non-being is impossibility to be, it is not impossibility to be an object, we think non-being effectively as impossibility of being. There exists then an object which is impossibility of being and this object which exists does not exist as being; it exists only as object of thought. Hence, two ways of existing, that which is proper to the logical and that which is proper to the real order.

There is perfect coextensiveness between being an object on the one hand, and nothing on the other. The impossible as opposed to entire being and entire ^{being} is opposed to the impossible; being and non-being have an equal universality. Consequently the logical order is as universal as the real order. But if in the order of our knowledge being is grasped first and in a fashion independent of this knowledge, the universality of non-being will be posterior to that of being: non-being will be less universal. What does that mean? That there would be some being which is not opposed to the impossible, that some impossible would be possible. Necessarily the impossible will be less universal than being. And in this case, non-being cannot be absolutely opposed to being. We must conclude that there is some being which at the same time is possible and impossible under the same respect: nothing becomes a particular case of being and one could say that being becomes a particular case of nothing since nothing has become possible. Thus we are led to radical scepticism of which most men are unwitting but fervent partisans.

All those who accord primacy to the principle of identity do not take account of the absolute transcendence of being which as an entirety is opposed to nothing, do not take account of the transcendence of non-being which as a whole is opposed to being. They do not take notice that with the first principle we have affair with a simultaneous transcendence of being and non-being which is not at all contradictory since this transcendence simply founds the distinction of the logical and real orders.

Therefore the distinction of the logical order and the real order is founded in this simultaneous transcendence of being and of non-being. As we will see this makes possible on the one hand a philosophy of being and on the other a transcendental dialectic.

To clarify the reputation suppose the first principle is stated thus: that which is is. Is this a true judgement? Can I conclude from it as some say, that it is impossible that a thing be and not be at the same time and in the same respect? No.

That which is is, that which is not is not. How can one conclude from that that it is impossible that a thing which is might not be at the same time and in the same respect. It seems that it would be possible. Consequently to give a sense to a principle of identity it is necessary to have recourse to the principle of contradiction, which means that it is conditioned and is not first.

C O P Y

If the first principle were that which is is which implied at the same time that which is not is not, would that permit us to say that it is impossible that a thing be and not be at the same time and in the same respect? This would be possible if it were possible that a thing be and not be at the same time and in the same respect; therefore the value of the deduction which I wish to make depends on another principle which is not conditioned like that which I wish to deduce; but this principle which is not conditioned is first with respect to that which I wish to deduce, and that which I wish to deduce is that to which I have recourse; this shows that if one does not speak of the principle of contradiction it will be necessary to bring it in at a certain moment and then all we wish to justify will be conditioned by the first principle, by another principle. The other principle will be conditioning, it will be first. The principle of contradiction has a value which is in no wise conditioned and that if it is not certain that this principle is the first what is said will never be certain.

If one wants to maintain a distinction between the logical and real orders it is necessary to see it directly implied in the very first principle. If one confuses these two orders the impossible becomes possible, being implies some impossible and the impossible implies some being. Or again, if the logical order were inferior to being in transcendence there would be some being which escaped this logical order which is founded in non-being. Being would go beyond non-being that is being would be more extensive than the impossible. If it went beyond (deborde) the impossible it becomes possible to ~~xxx~~ be impossible, impossible to be possible hence nothing is certain.

The possibility of certitude and of science is founded on the distinction of the logical and real orders. Which distinction is founded on being and non-being which are coextensive. It is the first division that one can make, anterior to that which we make in being since before we distinguished divisions in being we must opposed it to nothing.

The principle of identity raised up to the first principle is either a tautology or it leads to agnosticism or ontologism. It is impossible to think being without at the same time thinking non-being and visa-versa.

It is impossible to think non-being, the impossible as such, without thinking being and if you had first of all to affirm being and if you could then affirm non-being you would thus have two objects of the intelligence which would be radically distinct in the sense that one would be independent of the other; then non-being would be something which could not be - this would be contradictory even to thought. It is impossible to think the one without the other, they are given together simultaneously. If we could think being in an absolutely affirmative fashion without recourse to the negation, to nothing, our knowledge would

C O P Y

be divine. One would grasp directly the whole content of being; negation would be superfluous. But just because our knowledge does not extend actually to all things in an exhaustive fashion we have need of making intervene nothingness, and that at the beginning, in the first judgment of our intelligence.

You ask: how is it that one can discuss the first principle? One does not really discuss the first principle. Suppose that in a discussion one sustains that the first principle is that of contradiction, another that of identity, they do not speak of the same thing. If they spoke of the same thing it would be possible to think the contradictory. One does not think of the same degree of universality as the other. In fact, philosophy did not begin with metaphysics; and Aristotle was the first to grasp the opposition of contradiction in a reflected and explicit fashion. To know it, to know that one is in possession of a first principle and to use it is different and to speak of it is a third thing. When it is a question of great philosophical systems, it is absolutely useless to discuss questions other than that of the first principle; they are not in accord on the principle of contradiction, the great systems; little systems are hung on anything.

Plato spoke of the principle of identity; Aristotle of the principle of contradiction. Because Plato started from the principle of identity, he confused the logical with the real order, all his seductions are purely logical. Aristotle, on the contrary, since for him being and nonbeing were not confused, because he understood their opposition of contradiction, he always knew when he was making logic and when he was making philosophical science. That is the only difference, but it is a big one. It is good to know that there are some things which are not easy. Very few take account of the difficulty of things.

Let us now rejoin the question of objectivity where we have raised it. We have seen that knowledge can be limited in its objectivity. From this we do not have to conclude that there exists some knowledge which will be in a certain measure subjective. I mean that the fact of imposing a limitation on objectivity does not impose subjectivity on that objectivity; one can be less objective without being subjective. For example (a not too exact analogy) the whole number 7 is less than 8, but 7 is as much a number as 8. Likewise for limited objective knowledge, it remains objective; subjectivity is not imposed on it.

Now let us apply this idea to sensible and intellectual knowledge. Sensible knowledge will be infinitely less objective than intellectual, it will extend only to a certain genus of being of which it grasps only a superficial aspect. Which is not to say that sensible knowledge is in a certain measure subjective; not at all - sense knowledge is objective, but it is little objective which doesn't mean that it is a little subjective. Intellectual knowledge, insofar as it has being for its object, is purely and simply ob-

C O P Y

jective with respect to being. It is absolutely objective since it conceives being as a pure object which is not in a subject. Yet this objective knowledge is limited in another respect, in the measure that this knowledge of being as being does not make us know the whole content of being in an explicit manner. Again, this limitation which is imposed on our intellectual knowledge does not entail subjectivity but simply a limit. A limit which is in no wise in the object given, but in the subject; and the subject in the measure that it is limited is not engaged in the knowledge in so far as it is limited. (cf. De Veritate, 20;2;c. - 5, ad 1)

One should not then confuse the limitation of objectivity with the question of error and falsity. The problem of the objectivity of knowledge and the problem of truth and falsity will be deprived of meaning if that of objectivity is not resolved first. In fact, there will be all the difference between the objectivity of knowledge and the truth of knowledge that exists between ignorance and error. One does say that an ignorant one is in error; he who is in error knows, only his knowledge is false; it is not simply the privation of knowledge. Ignorance is a privation; error a contrary. Error and truth are opposed as contraries.

Just to have posed as first problem that of truth and falsity, Plato arrived at the consideration of being as being and to oppose it to nothing. He who adopts the platonist position as have the majority of moderns, never come to resolve the problem of the objectivity of knowledge. In fact they think the objectivity of knowledge ought to be resolved in the solution of the problem of truth and falsity. Not at all. If you begin with truth and falsity, what will be your criterion? Truth? But that is what you wish to know. You wish a criterion to distinguish the true from the false. Where will you find it? Will you go further? If you ought to go further or above, you can go anywhere and you will not find it.

It is clear that the question of objectivity is anterior to the question of truth and falsity. When you have spoken of the truth you have not yet said all; that is why S Thomas does not tell us that the object of the intelligence is the true; the first object is being.

The objectivity of knowledge is connected with being; the truth of knowledge is connected with being as true. That doesn't mean that a thing can be without being true, but in the order of knowledge the order which we follow in the discovery of the transcendental properties of being, unity is the first property of being - truth comes after.

Yet one must admit that error is due in a certain manner to the subjectivity which is opposed to objectivity. Error is found only in the judgment, in the measure that the judgment brings in composition and division. But intelligences which have need to judge

C O P Y

by having recourse to composition and division, such beings ought to have recourse to this genus of judgment because of the potentiality of their intelligence. Angels, who do not judge by composition and division, judge absolutely, they cannot err. With respect to objects (proportioned), it is absolutely impossible that they make mistakes since they do not pass from the state of potency to the state of act in knowledge.

(Several pages missing malheureusement...)

Speculative knowledge differs from practical knowledge by the end. The end of speculative knowledge is nothing other than knowledge itself; knowledge for the sake of knowledge; knowing for the sake of knowing; this is speculative knowing. In the case of practical knowledge, on the contrary, the end is either a work to make or to do.

One can characterize practical knowledge in another manner, from the side of the object. In the case of speculative knowledge, the object is the measure of knowledge, the object is imposed, it is the object which is first. In the case of practical knowledge it is the knower himself who is the measure of the object. For example, I study a tree; what I want is to know the tree such as it is in itself, I wish to be measured by the tree, by the object itself. When it is question of a house, on the contrary, I wish to impose my idea on the matter, I am the measure. In sculpture, when one makes a statue, one imposes a conception conceived within, one imposes it on the matter, that is, the interior conception which we make is imposed on a matter. The measure of this work is in me as in its first cause. I impose myself on the object in the practical; in the speculative it is the object which is imposed on me. Let us check an article of saint Thomas: I, q. 14, article 16: Dieu a-t-il des choses une science speculative.

In opposition ~~one~~ can say this: one should attribute to God what is most noble. But speculation is more noble than the practical, as Aristotle shows au debut of the metaphysics.

First let us note that a science is purely speculative, such another purely practical, and yet another in one respect is practical and in another speculative. To take account of this we should observe that a science can be called speculative in three ways: 1. In that which concerns the objects of knowledge, if they are things which escape the action of any subject. 2. With regard to the way of knowing, as if an architect studies the house in defining or analysing with regard to its concepts and in envisaging its abstract attributes. To proceed thus, is to consider speculatively the object of the practical; not to see there a thing to make, knowing that a thing is made by applying a form to a matter, not in resolving the composite into its diverse formal elements which are known as universals by the mind. 3. With regard to the end pursued. For thus as Aristotle says, the practical intelligence differs from the speculative by finality.

C O P Y

In fact the practical intelligence has for end the end of action; the end of the speculative intelligence if the consideration of truth. So much so that if an architect is asked how to make a house but without proposing to himself an effective result, only to instruct, this will be in that which concerns the end a speculative thought yet in a practical manner. Given this the knowledge which is speculative by reason of the thing known is speculative only; that which is speculative as to the mode or as to the end is in part speculative and in part practical. And when it is all oriented towards the ends of action it is practical with regard to everything.

Consequently, we must say that God has of Himself only speculative knowledge for He is not Himself matter for action. But of all the rest He has knowledge speculative and practical. Speculative, with regard to the mode of its conception for all that we can see speculatively in combining or analysing concepts, God knows in a infinitely more perfect fashion. Be it question of that which He can do, but does not really at any time, God does not have of it a practical knowledge according as knowledge is called practical from ~~xxxx~~ the fact of its end; He has in this sense a practical knowledge only of that which He does at one time or another. With respect to evil, although God cannot be its author, it like the good falls under His practical knowledge insofar as God permits it, prevents it, or introduces order into it. It is thus that illnesses are an object of practical knowledge for the doctor whose art is applied to heal them.

Hence the knowledge that God has of Himself is uniquely speculative, God does not know Himself practically. If He did He would know how to make Himself, He would have to make Himself, He would have to consider Himself as a work to be executed. (for Marx practical knowledge is primary. What does that mean? He considers himself as the ultimate measure of the object but all the same he recognises that he is in potency, then the end would consist in making himself, he is as a god but as a god who ought to make himself who has only a practical knowledge of himself.)

We must say besides, that the practical depends on the speculative, and that it is absolutely impossible to start absolutely from the speculative order. I mean that one cannot consider the division of knowledge into speculative and practical as an absolute division which is founded in being as such so that the speculative intelligence would have on e object and the practical another, and that these two objects would be absolutely separated so that there would be two orders of knowledge absolutely opposed. That is simply impossible. In the last analysis the practical is always and necessarily ordered to the speculative as one can see in S. Thomas Summa Contra Gentiles III, 25.

All sciences are necessarily related to speculative sciences. Only speculative sciences can be ends in themselves. Metaphysicians

C O P Y

and theologians say that the last end of creation is the knowledge of God, which cannot ~~be speculative for God~~ only be speculative for God is not an object to be made. This is extremely important for today even scholastics tend to separate these two orders in a more or less absolute fashion. When for example, one pretends that moral is an essentially practical science, that it is a science which tells us what to do in general, for practical reasons, one introduces a distinction and separation to radical between the speculative and practical.

In the Summa Contra Gentiles III, 75 - S. Thomas asked that if divine providence extends to singular and contingent things: speculative science differs from practical science in that the first is perfected in penetrating into the universal, the perfection of the second consists in the application to the individual. In fact, speculative science has truth for its end which resides primarily and essentially outside matter and in universal whereas practical science has for its point an operation of which the term is an individual; the doctor is not interested in healing man in general but this particular man and that is the end of the entire medical science. It is certain that the government of providence goes into practical science since it places beings in relation to their end. The providence of God would be imperfect if it were occupied only with universals without extending to individuals.

Absolutely speaking, the knowledge of the particular adds nothing to speculative knowledge which bears formally on the unconditional universal. It is only accidentally that speculative knowledge has to be based on the particular, this dependence exists only for an intelligence measured by the object. But even in this case knowledge is properly speculative only in the measure that the intelligence due to the activity of the agent intellect disengages the singular object from its individuating conditions, and from all which renders it contingent. The existence of created things adds nothing to the divine speculative knowledge; the divine knowledge which created things in their particularity is practical. See ch. 97 of the same book where S. Thomas reduces this distinction to its last foundation, the distinction between the necessary and contingent.

Speculative knowledge bears on the necessary. That does not mean that the contingent totally escapes the necessary; the contingent is necessarily contingent, it is impossible that the contingent be and not be at the same time and in the same respect. Nihil enim adeo est contingens, quin in se aliquid necessarium habeat. But the contingent cannot be the object of speculative knowledge insofar as it is contingent. See in 6 eth 1.

With regard to the necessity that one encounters in the practical order, it has always as point of departure some hypothesis. Thus, when certain means are necessary to arrive at the desired end, these means only come into play because of the end. The last reason for this necessity is speculative: this human will wills necessarily

C O P Y

ly the good in general, but such a will does not exist by an absolute necessity; being given it is necessary that it will what it wills under the notion of the good in general (practical necessity) because it is of the very nature of the human will to will all it wills under the notion of the good in general (absolute speculative necessity).

We have need of the contingent to arrive at knowledge of the necessary. This passage from the contingent to the necessary is possible because the contingent is interior to being. The division of being into being per se and per accidens is interior to being; the two are opposed to the impossible. The contingent is necessary as possible; the existing contingent cannot be and not be at the same time and in the same respect; it is necessarily contingent; it is necessarily founded on the necessary; it is impossible that it arise from the necessary necessarily. Thus we mount from the contingent to the necessary; but we cannot redescend from the necessary to the contingent with necessity. Could we, the contingent would not be contingent. To go from the necessary to the contingent, we must pass by the divine free will whose works are practical.

If all were absolutely necessary, there would be no distinction between the practical and speculative orders, there would only be the speculative, all would be pure act, practical knowledge would be superfluous. This position would imply consequently the negation of the possible; the possible would be impossible. This confusion is the foundation of determinist pantheism.

If our knowledge were both speculative and practical, this would be because the contingent as contingent would be the cause of the necessary; nothingness would be a creative cause, i.e. the cause of the very esse of things.

Scientific Knowledge: science is defined as habitus per demonstrationem acquisitus.

a) Habitus: est qualitas quaedam, sec. quam inclinatur potentia ad actum. Our intelligence being originally pure potency, certain determinations are necessary to it thanks to which it is borne adequately toward its object. Nam habitus ad potentiam animae comparatur ut actus ad potentiam; cum potentia sit indeterminata quantum est de se, et per habitum determinetur ad hoc vel illud. (de virt. in communi, a. 3, c.

Quanto in primo aspectu apparet, habitus significare videtur aliquid potentiae superadditum, quo perficitur ad suam operationem. (de veritate, q. 20, a. 2)

...potentiae naturales sunt determinatae ad unum; et ideo per seipsas possunt in sua objecta, nec indigent aliquo superaddito ad agendum; potentiae autem rationales ad multa se habent, et hoc ad earum nobilitatem spectat. (ibid., ad 6)

C O P Y

Sed ea quae sunt ad utrumlibet, non habent aliquam formam ex qua declinent ad unum determinate; sed a proprio movente determinantur ad aliquid unum; et hoc ipso quod determinantur ad ipsum, quodammodo disponuntur in idem; et cum multoties inclinatur, determinantur ad idem a proprio movente, et firmatur in eis inclinatio determinata in illud; ita quod ista dispositio superinducta, est quasi quaedam forma per modum naturae tendens in unum. (q. de virt. a.9,c.)

b) Acquisitus: Habitus are not innate. Habitus are necessary just there where potencies are not determined by nature. It is important then to distinguish them from natural dispositions innate or acquired. There exists a habitus only at the moment where the potency is perfectly determined with respect to its object. That is why in the natural order angels have no habitus. (I-II, q.50, a.6)

c) Per demonstrationem:

(1) On the foundation of the distinction of the habitus, see I-II, q. 54; d. de Virt. a. 12.

(2) On the distinction of the habitus of the intelligence, see Ethics, book 6; I-II, q. 57.

(3) Let us analyse article 2 of q. 57 where saint Thomas shows the difference between science, understanding of first principles, and wisdom. Article 1 shows that it is only by extension that one can call the habitus of the speculative intelligence virtues.

"... virtus intellectualis speculativa est per quam intellectus speculativus perficitur ad considerandum verum; hoc enim est bonum opus eius." The speculative intellectual virtue perfects the intelligence for the operation which is proper to it. It follows that this virtue will determine the intelligence in a fashion completely certain and infallible, for truth is indivisible. There will be no habitus as long as there is hesitation.

Truth or the true can be considered dupliciter: - uno modo, as per se notum; alio modo as known through another. But what is per se notum, is as a principle and is perceived immediately by the intellect; and therefore the habitus perfecting the intellect in the consideration of the truths of this kind is called intellectus, which is the habitus of principles.

The knowledge of first principles is immediate; they are imposed on us with evidence and certitude having no need to be demonstrated. All can not be demonstrated; to demonstrate principles are necessary; if per impossible one could demonstrate principles, it would be necessary to found the demonstration; demonstrate the demonstration by a demonstration, and we would be involved in an infinite regress. Discourse separated from principles is consequently absurd. Some pretend that every principle is a hypothesis. If this were so, "every principle is a hypothesis" would either be a principle or a demonstrated conclusion. If this principle itself were in its turn a hypothesis, it is absurd to say that every principle is a hypothesis; this would be in fact a tautology which would mean: every hypothesis is an hypothesis. Which again puts us on the road of

C O P Y

the indefinite: that every hypothesis is an hypothesis is an hypothesis, etc. like a broken record. Hence: every principle is an hypothesis, is either a tautology or a contradiction in terms.

One can see that radical scepticism is a perfectly impossible thing. One can put on paper: it is impossible to know anything with certitude, but that signifies nothing, unless that it is possible to say the impossible, that language is not natural but ad placitum. The same goes for the following: it is at least impossible to know if it is impossible to know anything with certitude. All this supposes a certitude of incertitude, or a certitude on the incertitude of the certitude of the incertitude.

Others pretend that although first principles are certain, it is not certain that the demonstrations based on them are certain. This position is equally impossible, for it could only be founded on a demonstration: this incertitude is possible only if the demonstration on which it is based is true.

Hesitation before first principles can nevertheless be explained. These principles are first, true, immediate. But they do not show us all the deductions which can be made from them; in this respect they are obscure. The throwing away of the obscurity of the most evident principles is at the origin of all modern philosophy (the clear and distinct ideas of Descartes).

Verum autem quod est per aliud notum, non statim percipitur ab intellectu, sed per inquisitionem rationis; et se habet in ratione termini. Quod quidem potest esse dupliciter: uno modo, ut sit ultimum in aliquo genere; alio modo, ut sit ultimum respectu totius cognitionis humanae.

And because those things which are known last quoad nos, are prior and more knowable according to nature (I Phys) therefore that which is ultimate with respect to the totality of human knowledge, is that which is first and most knowable according to nature. And wisdom is concerned with these, since it considers the highest causes (I Meta 1 et 2): hence it fittingly judges and orders all, because the perfect and universal judgment cannot be had without resolution to first causes.

That indeed which is ultimate in this or that genus of knowables, science perfects the intellect; hence according to the diverse genera of knowables there are diverse habitus of sciences, whereas wisdom is only one.

The more things are knowable in themselves, the less they are for us. The more perfect they are, the more they are knowable absolutely; a being is intelligible in the measure that it is in act. The proportioned object of our intelligence is the material quiddity which includes matter and hence is more knowable for us.

The sciences in which in going from principles which are more knowable for us, we penetrate plus avant in that which is more intelligible in se, are distinct, not according to the diverse degrees of absolute intelligibility of the objects considered in their proper

C O P Y

being, but according to the diverse degrees of intelligibility which they have for us, i.e. according to the degree of cognoscibility that they take on in our intelligence: according as one can consider them either with matter, or without matter, i.e. according to their degree of remoteness from matter and of approach to immateriality. Without which there would be as many sciences as degrees of being.

There exist indeed some last causes for each science, i.e. *causae ultimae in aliquo genere*, and in this respect the inferior sciences such as philosophy of nature can be called wisdoms by extension. (*Sapiens dicitur in unoquoque genere qui considerat causam altissimam illius generis. I, q.1, a.6*) Moreover wisdom simpliciter is that which considers all things in the light of the absolutely last cause—God. Among the natural sciences it is the privilege of metaphysics of which the principal subject is God. Although its principal subject is God, God is not its formal object, rather that is being as being. In supernatural theology, on the contrary, God is both the formal object (*ratio deitatis*) and principal subject. — One sees also why wisdom is one: it sees all things in the perspective of the absolutely last cause which is one. The distinctions which we conceive in its subject are distinctions of reason. Moreover the unity of God does not escape us completely, since we know perfectly that the distinctions we conceive are distinctions of reason.

For a more complete description of science, read Aristotle, *Post. Anal. I, chap.2*.

Note the necessary character of science. This is an exigency which we have forgotten today. What we are in the habit of calling "scientific" does not surpass probability, above all when it is question of a necessary why.

Demonstration is therefore generative of science which is certain knowledge through causes: *cognitio certa per causas*.

Why do we say that metaphysics is both science and wisdom: how can one distinguish these two properties? "... *sapientia est quaedam scientia, in quantum habet id quod est commune omnibus scientiis, ut scilicet ex principiis conclusiones demonstrat. Sed quia habet aliquid proprium supra alias scientias, in quantum sc. de omnibus iudicat, et non solum quantum ad conclusiones, sed etiam quantum ad prima principia; et ideo habet rationem perfectioris virtutis quam scientia.*" (s. Thomas, *ibid*, ad 1)

In replying to the difficulty posed this text raises a new one. We have seen that wisdom properly speaking extends to all things, but how can one say that it judges even first principles? Ought one not proceed from first indemonstrable principles? How can it judge them? To judge them, is not that to surpass them?

Let us consider an example. We have seen that the principle of contradiction is the first of all first principles. The most salient, it is at the same time the most obscure. Is it not astonishing that

C O P Y

we can affirm being only a travers a negation? Is it not astonishing that one of the terms of the very first judgment bearing on being be the impossible? The fact that it is so does not diminish wonder.

What relation is there between science, wisdom and wonder? Read Aristotle, Metaphysics, chapter 2, where he shows that philosophy is a pure and disinterested science.

To know how to judge in a sapiential manner the first principle will consist in supressing astonishment in its subject to finish with a contrary astonishment: it is necessary to arrive at seeing that it would be astonishing if the first principle were not what it is.

By what means do we come to reverse this astonishment? Little by little philosophy apprises us that of all intelligences the human mind is the most feeble, so feeble that it must take its proportioned object from the mobile quiddity of material things. This proportioned object is contingent, it can be and not be: it is affirmation and negation. The existence of the necessary absolute (God) is the reply to this astonishing paradox of the contingent. Knowing now the contingent in this new perspective, knowing why the material quiddity founds both an affirmation and an negation, we see that nothing would be as astonishing as if the first principle were not the principle of contradiction.

In this way we can demonstrate that the first principle ought to be the principle of contradiction. But ~~that~~ does that mean that we have demonstrated the principle of contradiction? By no means. In the last analysis the demonstration made is based on the principle of contradiction which is virtually implied in every demonstration. The demonstration of the existence of God is founded on it. But we also know that the existence of God does not depend on this demonstration: God does not exist because the contingent exists: having demonstrated his existence we know that it is the contingent which depends absolutely on him; that the contingent is absolutely conditioned.

We have simply demonstrated, thanks to the principle of contradiction which we already knew, seeing the nature of the proportioned object of our intelligence, that it is impossible that this principle be other than it is for the human intelligence. And thus we judge it by itself. This reflexion is possible because the principle in question extends to all things, and hence is included in itself and touches itself.

This example shows us the profound amplitude of wisdom. It pertains to it also to return on science, not this or that science, but science as such, on the science engendered by demonstration. Metaphysics can apprise us as to why we are obliged to have recourse to reasoning, to discourse; why an intelligence obliged to find its object in the material quiddity has to have recourse to middle terms to attain knowledge of things most intelligible in se. This comes from the nature

C O P Y

itself of the matter which disperses all things, whence the necessity of abstraction and of judgment by composition and division, as of the whole syllogistic apparatus of human science.

The possibility of referring the multiplicity of the sciences to the unity of wisdom is founded on the transcendence and unity of being, object of metaphysics. If being as being were multiple, wisdom would be impossible. "It is wise to listen not to me but to my word, and to confess that all things are one. Of all those whose discourse I have heard, there has not been one who understood wisdom as separated from all. Wisdom is one thing. It consists in knowing the thought by which all things are directed by all things. There is only one wise man." Heraclitus; fragments 1.18,19,65. The love of wisdom impeded Heraclitus from being consequent with his pluralism.

We can now see the difference between science and wisdom. Metaphysics is science in the measure that it deduces conclusions like any other science. But in science the conclusions take us away from the principles, and science does not bear on principles. Wisdom, on the contrary, turns these conclusions toward the principles to judge them in the light of the total acquisition of the sciences.

In his reply to the second objection (I-II, q.57, a.2) S Thomas tells us why there is only one habitus of first principles for all the speculative sciences. It is because one can consider the first principles in two ways: Principia vero demonstrationis possunt seorsum considerari, absque hoc quod considerentur conclusiones. Possunt etiam considerari simul cum conclusionibus, prout principia in conclusiones deducuntur. Considerare ergo hoc secundo modo principia, pertinet ad scientiam, quae considerat etiam conclusiones; sed considerare principia secundum seipsa, pertinet ad intellectum.

When we consider the principles in themselves as known sine medio, they are grasped by a single habitus. When we envisage them as turned toward conclusions, as illuminating conclusions, the principles are attained by the divers habitus of the distinct sciences. (Cf. JSTH, Curs. Phil, T.I, p.827b12)

In his reply to the third objection, saint Thomas tells us why it is necessary to exclude opinion and suspicion from the habitus of the speculative intelligence.

On all this, cf. JSTH, Curs. Theol. T.VI, p.436 et seq.

We now know the foundation of the distinction between speculative and practical knowledge: the distinction between the necessary and the contingent. It remains to apply this principle to the habitus of the intelligence. (The truth of the practical intellect differs from the truth of the speculative which latter consists in the conformity of the intellect to reality. Since the intellect cannot be infallibly conformed to contingent things, but only to necessary, therefore no speculative habit of contingent things is an intellectu-

C O P Y

al virtue. The truth of the practical intellect is taken from the conformity to rectified appetite. Which conformity has no place in necessities, which the human will does not make, but only in contingent things which can be done by us whether agibilia (interior) or factibilia (exterior). Therefore only about contingent things is there posited an intellectual virtue of the practical intellect, art of factibilia and prudence of agibilia.)(I-II, q.57,a.5, ad3)

The speculative intelligence is measured by things. There can be an infallible conformity of object and intelligence only if the two terms are equally determined. Therefore the speculative intelligence bears on the necessary and cannot be infallibly determined by the contingent as contingent. And if the certitude of the contingent flows from the speculative intelligence, the contingent would be necessary, for reasons given above.

We need not conclude that the contingent wholly escapes certitude. God knows with perfect certitude every future contingent because he sees them in the presence of his eternoty, and this because he is the cause of the contingent. This is the certitude of the artist; creation is a work freely willed by God. The truth of this work consists in its conformity to the idea freely formed by God. The contingency of the work consists in this: God could not have created it, or created something else. The work of art does not draw its truth from ~~xxx~~ what God can make; if this were so all which God could make would exist in fact; He would not be free, the work would not be a work of art; there would be no contingency; all would be necessary and all would be God.

One sees from this example that the certitude of the practical is ~~not in the work itself considered absolutely as object, but in its conformity with the measuring intelligence or the right will.~~ Consequently, although the matter of the practical intelligence is contingent and variable, there can be perfect rectitude and infallibility from the side of the regulating intelligence. (Note that the infallibility of the practical knowledge of God does not render necessary the contingent things considered in themselves absolutely.)

This idea appears also in the following examples: whatever the perfection of the musician, whatever the determination and certitude of his art, he can not play on a bad instrument; and yet the defectiveness of the instrument takes nothing from the certitude of his art. Likewise the prudent man can err, but not absolutely insofar as prudent: some perfectly unforeseeable circumstances can render his judgment and his command inefficacious, which substracts nothing from his right intention, from the perfection of his deliberation which can extend only to what is more or less foreseeable, nor from the vigour of his perfectly justified command. Read VI Ethics, chapters 3 and 4. Also I-II, q.57, arts. 3 and 4.

In art. 4, note the profound distinction between art and prudence. For what follows, cf. JSTH, Curs. Theol. T.VI, p466 et seq.

C O P Y

There is first of all a distinction from the side of the matter of these habitus. Prudence bears on the agibile, that is, on voluntary acts as voluntary, as free. Agere is immanent activity, in man insofar as he acts freely. Art, on the contrary, bears on the factibile one exterior works, on malleable things on which one can impress a new determination. Facere is said properly of a transitive activity which terminates without.

There is also an essential difference between art and prudence from the side of the form. The form of art consists in regulation, and in the conformity of the work to the idea of the artisan or artist, which regulation is impressed in the makeable which always has some notion of exteriority, be the object matter properly so called or objects which can be ordered. When art simply orders objects sans affecting them as objects (e.g. in logic), it impresses on them all the same an order which has the notion of form: *ordo quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, puta cum ordinat conceptus suos ad invicem et signa conceptuum, quae sunt voces significativae.* (I Eth. 1) In prudence, on the contrary, the form impressed on acts is a regulation which orders these acts towards a fitting end. Prudence determines what are the conditions of such an act in concrete and contingent circumstances, in conformity with the rule of reason.

There is also the difference in the modus operandi: first of all from the side of intelligence. In art, the rules are perfectly determined: *procedit per certas vias*. The great works of art have this characteristic that there exists only one way of expressing them. When one can exteriorize a certain idea in diverse manners, it is because this idea is quite undetermined. The determination of the viae is proportional to the perfection of the work. (e.g. Bach and Wagner proposed ends quite different, but their means of expression are extremely determined.) The rectitude of the judgment of the artist depends in no wise on contingent circumstances. Prudence, on the other hand, proceeds by arbitrary ways and according to contingent circumstances which present themselves. There are many diverse ways of arriving at the same end.

What characterizes the prudent man, says Aristotle, is the faculty of successful deliberation on things which are good and advantageous to him, not under some particular respects like health or fortitude, but which render his entire life good...etc. VI Eth, chap.5. The deliberation which consists in seeking ways to follow to achieve the end, is the very essence of prudence: the prudent man is *bene consiliativus*. - Since the ways of art are determined, deliberation will not be essential to it. The certitude of art is not a consequence of deliberation: cf. In II Physl, lect. 14, n.8. Moreover, it can happen, because of the contingency of the matter and circumstances, that certain arts include deliberation: as navigation, medicine, military and agriculture; but in the measure that deliberation is necessary to them, one calls them prudences. (We will see that applied dialectic is a little like prudence, in the measure that it removes itself from the perfection of logic.)

C O P Y

There is also a fundamental difference between art and prudence from the point of view of appetite. This distinction responds to the difficulty concerning the morality of art. What the artist wishes is not his own perfection, but the perfection of the work: cf. I-II, q.57, a.5, ad 1.

That is why Aristotle says that one ought to praise the artist who makes mistakes wittingly, but not the artist who does so unwittingly. On the contrary, one should say that the prudent man who sins wittingly is worse than he who does so unwittingly: VI Eth. c.5. The sculptor who proposes to make a monster and makes a handsome man is a bad sculptor: cf. Cajetan In I-II, q.57, a.5.

This permits us to see the difference between the rectitude of the appetite in art and in prudence or moral. The will of the artist is right if it is conformed to the end he has chosen; the rectitude of his appetite depends on its submission to the good of the work which the artist has chosen to make. If he chooses to make a monster his appetite will be right if it is conformed to the production of a monster. - It is quite otherwise in prudence. The prudent man does not choose the end, that is determined by nature and by the author of nature, which causes all the difficulty in moral activity. And the truth of the prudential judgment depends on a will of which the rectitude is presupposed, rectitude which consists in the right intention of the end. And this rectitude is the very principle of prudence, a principle which conditions the truth of the prudential judgment and the goodness of the act commanded.

In the domain of speculative knowledge wisdom is the architectonic virtue: it is, with respect to intellectus and the sciences, as the architect. In the practical domain, it is prudence which holds the role of architectonic virtue, and more especially political prudence. cf. In VI Eth, lec. 7. n.1201.

As prudence extends only to the means of arriving at the last end, it is not the fullness of wisdom. Prudence extends only to the operable good insofar as it is a human good. Thus, the last end of man is a good, but this end is not a human good: God is not an operable: God is a good for man, which is quite another thing.

Although prudence is especially, maxime necessaria ad vitam humanam, it is inferior to wisdom properly said. As Aristotle said: Politics or prudence would be the best of sciences only if man were the best thing in the universe. (VI Eth c.7) Prudence is wisdom only in human affairs: cf. II-II, q.47, a.2, ad 1)

It seems to be a scholastic today one ought to calumniate Aristotle. The damnably stupid ideas which are sometimes attributed to him can be justified only by denying the authenticity of his complete works. Consider the quote given just above. It is because one does

C O P Y

not take account of the very essential distinction which Aristotle makes between the architectonic virtue in the practical and speculative orders that one can attribute to him the idea that the city is the most transcendent with respect to man. Aristotle distinguished between the transcendence in the practical order and that in the speculative order. The common operable good of society is the best. But above every operable good there is a supreme good, Pure Act, which draws all things as end; this supreme good is not operable. Although the whole practical order is oriented toward God he himself is above the practical order, the last end of all things. In other words, Aristotle has distinguished well the common good which consists in the order of things, and the sovereign common good which is separate and the common good to which the first is ordered. Cf. XII Metaphysics, c. 7 and 10.

The authors who reproach this idea wish that practically and in his quality of free person, man surpass naturally the community of which he is part only insofar as he is an individual (as if society was founded on material individuation). For Aristotle and S. Thomas it is by speculative knowledge that man is raised above the human, and that his will can extend to a good superior to the operable common good. In this order there is no liberty. These authors do not take account of the essential implications of the distinction between the practical and speculative.

One sees even less why appeal is made to personality; since man is in political society just because he is a person: the societies of insects are not political societies. To say that he surpasses society because he is a person, is to employ a less formal language than did Aristotle or S. Thomas. It would again be necessary to make precise in what he surpasses society. What it is necessary to say in philosophy is that wisdom simpliciter is superior to practical wisdom.

At bottom, the moderns revolt against the limits of the practical order; they would that practical knowledge had by its very nature an amplitude equal to that of speculative knowledge, that the entirety of being were an agibile or a factibile. If Aristotle were really wrong, we would have to say that there exists a natural conflict between the speculative and practical, between the necessary and the contingent: a conflict which man ought to surmount by his liberty.

All this is at the least quite strange. S. Thomas never pretended to correct the thought of Aristotle on this point. It is true that theology poses some new problems in this matter: but their solution cannot modify the philosophical doctrine envisaged purely as such: that would be tantamount to saying that there exists a conflict between nature and grace. Even in its present state civil society is a perfect society.

C O P Y

Art and Science: there is a danger of confusing prudence with art.
We will determine the reason for this confusion.

The prudent man does not choose the last end; the rectitude of his appetite with respect to that end governs the perfection of his judgment. This last end is nothing other than beatitude (in the natural order, the abstract knowledge of God; in the supernatural order, the intuitive vision of the divine essence.) The explicit knowledge of this end is speculative: the explicit love of this end is conditioned by this knowledge. Hence, to substract prudence from speculative knowledge, destroys prudence. The prudent man would find himself in the situation of the artist: he would act in view of an end chosen, prudence would then have become art.

Why does anyone wish to substitute art for prudence? Because prudence supposes: (a) conformity between appetite and the last end which is imposed on us as measure; (b) it should order all our acts to this end. The prudent man is before an end he has not chosen: this end is transcendent and universal. Prudence supposes a total and difficult submission to a superior norm which is imposed absolutely.

In art, on the contrary, the end is particular and chosen: the perfection of art does not suppose this rectitude of the appetite with respect to a necessary and universal end. The moral life would be much more easy if we could replace it with arts; prudence and the moral virtues which it rules would be replaced with arts. If there existed an art we could introduce into the intelligence and appetites which would impose a perfect determination with respect to their objects, if the indetermination of our faculties was and "factibile externum."

The application we have for art makes itself felt in the domain of prudence, but it makes itself felt also in the domain of science. We can even say that the tendency to see in art a substitute for science and prudence constitutes the base of modern civilization. The fundamental characteristic of modern civilization (in capitals) is nothing other than the refusal of the object, refusal of every objective measure: this is the essence of humanism, the renovation of the ancient theory of the man-as-measure.

What sciences are recognized by moderns? The speculative arts: dialectical logic, pure mathematics, experimental physics and psychology, etc. All these sciences are at bottom dialectical art, even the experience on which the experimental sciences are based implies art as an essential element.

If we insist on the difficulty of speculative knowledge, on the relative facility of succeeding in the arts and the diverse attempts to which this state of things exposes us, it is fitting to insist a little on the very determined reasons but very hidden reasons which explain this universal empire which art tries to exercise in all domains.

C O P Y

(1) If the experimental sciences as we know them today realized the type of science of which it is question in the preceding (p. 16), the distinction which we have made between art and science would not be clear; we would even have to conclude that every science is an art. That the experimental sciences are not truly sciences in the Aristotelian sense is a most essential point. Here we will only indicate the difference between the properly scientific experience of philosophy and the experience on which the experimental sciences are based, an experience we call dialectic.

Although the experimental sciences are speculative by their end, they are based on a practical experience.

The experience we have of being, of the impossibility of being and not being at the same time and same respect, of the multiplicity of things, of successive and continuous duration, of knowledge, etc., and the experience on which is founded our knowledge of the biped character of man and of all that which is formally treated by what today we call experimental sciences, are of a manifestly different nature. It does not suffice to examine a single individual to determine that man is a biped; we must examine a multitude of cases. For the rest, whatever be the number of observed cases, we do not see an essential lien between man and biped. If the lien were essential, the examination of a single individual case would have sufficed; we would have to conclude that a non-biped is not a man, not a rational animal. It is the same for the intelligence such as experimental psychology defines it. On the contrary, we do not need a great number of cases to know that it is impossible to be and not be at the same...etc. nor to know that multiplicity exists and hence act and potency, nor to know that a being that endures successively and continuously is composed of form and matter. In all these cases a single experience suffices; the universal is given immediately. It suffices to examine a single man to determine that every man is necessarily a rational animal. Even when several experiences are necessary in this domain, the plurality is necessary only to awaken our mind; in the end we see that a single case would suffice.

Dialectical experience is never complete; the indication of the universal is never achieved. The experience itself is a certain discourse. It can be sufficient to found a dialectical theory, a theory which cannot adequately rejoin reality, and which for that very reason is enclosed in the logical order; but it cannot found science.

Besides, speculative dialectical experience and practical dialectical experience can be distinguished. Speculative: not that this experience itself is speculative: it is called this because it leads to theories which one pursues for themselves; knowledge is sought here for itself. It is in this sense that we can call the experiences of the physicist and astronomer speculative dialectical experiences: they constitute the point of departure of a theory constructed that we may better know the world. It is understood that one can make use of these knowledges for a practical end: but this is not the principal

C O P Y

aim of physics. The prudent man can make use of the analysis of the passions made by philosophy of nature, which substracts not a wit from the speculative character of philosophy of nature. (We will see that every experimental theory is formally logical; and that it is thanks to this logical character that it can be speculative.)

- * Practical dialectical experience is that of practical art and of prudence. It is practical in the measure that it apprises us of how to act and how to do, notwithstanding the contingency of the agibile and facitibile. The prudent ought to foresee despite the contingency of the future. " Prudens dicitur quasi porro videns: perspicax enim est, et incertum ~~numquam~~ videt casus... Cognoscere autem futura ex praesentibus vel praeteritis, quod pertinet ad prudentiam, proprie rationis est: quia hoc per quandam collationem agitur." (II-II, 47, 1) " Quod quia infinitas singularium non potest ratione humana comprehendere, inde est quod sunt incertae providentiae nostrae, ut dic. Sap. IX. Tamen per experientiam singularia infinita reducuntur ad aliquam finitam quae ut in pluribus accidunt, quorum cognitio sufficit ad prudentiam humanam." (ibid. a. 3, ad 2) This experience of the prudent permits foresight with a certain probability into the future and the consequences which an act might entail. The practical experience of the artist makes known to him the matter on which he works its possibilities etc. Practice even permits him to find and acquire the necessary conditions for the certitude and promptness of the habitus. Such is the experience necessary for the gramatical art. The rules of grammar are not natural. They are instituted and have many exceptions, one cannot deduce them scientifically. That is why experience is necessary for gramatical art.

One of the most characteristic notes of dialectic experience speculative as well as practical is the collatio intentionum individualium of which S. Thomas speaks in the text cited. The singulars which one attains in dialectical experience are essentially multiple in definite and have no basic unity which is imposed of itself. That is why these singulars differ from the singulars of scientific experience which have the unity of their specific or generic identity whatever be their numerical multiplicity. This numerical multiplicity is inexhaustible but the formality of the singulars is absolutely determined, like the rationality of man. In the case of the singulars of dialectical experience the formality itself is not perfectly determined. But unity and determination are two essential conditions of intelligibility. To supply objective unity to this defect the experimenter intervenes the collatio, choosing, reduction to unity. The search for unity cannot be accomplished, that is why the experimenter is obliged to make one; he makes a synthesis of that which happens in a majority of cases. This knowledge suffices also to justify the construction of a theory which supposes to bring us little by little to reality.

Dialectic experience implies therefore a certain factor of art. Think of an experience of physics, there is practical art in the experimentation. And this art is directed by another art, by the art

C O P Y

implied in the construction of a theory suggested only by a pre-seeding experience in which maintains and directs the new one. The expressions make experiments and make theories are perfectly rigorous in this demand. One makes a dialectic induction and the universal to which this induction arrives is something of fact and of construct. (The error of Kant consisted in admitting only of dialectic experience)

But the principle of synthesis, of this unity inadequately founded on reality, is in the experimenter in the measure that this constructed unity surpasses that of the data of experience, in the measure that it is a work of art. The principle of art is in the artist whereas the principle of science properly so called is in the object itself. In science one submits entirely to the object which is the end as object. In art one constructs the object; in practical sciences the end is as a construction of the subject (post. anal. I, 41, n.7)

In scientific experience the object is imposed absolutely; in dialectic experience the experimenter exercises a certain control. That is what one sees better in the experiences quite advanced although there is control in the most elementary dialectic experiences. This control exercised by the experimenter has caused that experimental science is said to render us master of the object studied. Experimental science gives us a certain practical mastery as one can see quite easily in physics and chemistry.

Dialectic experience is simply suggested like the sensible experience of which Plato speaks in the phaedon (72e - 80e). Not having recognized the difference between scientific and dialectic experience the whole philosophy of Plato is virtually subjectivist. Aristotle will show that the ideas to which dialectic experience leads are themselves simply dialectic ie. logical.

(2) The great admiration that we have for the art disposes us ill for excepting that art is easier than science, that nature. An ordinary man can be a father. But this is a very superficial point of view, for generation is not a work of the reason and will of man but of nature. Created art cannot produce a nature. See Ethics n. 1155. Only the works of divine art are both artificial and natural. Created art presupposes nature and imitates it.

Art cannot attain the intrinsic principles of nature and by that it differs also from the science of nature (n. 1157) That is why the science of nature does not make its object but is entirely measured by it.

The admiration of the modern common man is not for nature but for the experimental science of nature and not insofar as it makes us know the world as it is in itself but insofar as it manifests the power of man. This explains the cult of which scientists are the object today. (This would be a disaster for philosophy to be an object of such a cult as the history of modern phil. proves. One

C O P Y

speaks often of the cult of Aristotle in the middle ages when Aristotle was esteemed for the light he shed on things. The cult of philosophers is on the contrary something quite modern, phil. having abandoned philosophy to make works of art. It is believed today that phil. is a synonym for philosophies. It is true that experimental science brings home to the common man the ingenious of man. But one would have to be quite naive to believe that the veneration of the masses for modern science differs from the veneration of savage people for magic art.

(3) Man cannot seek himself in science envisaged purely as such. Doubtless he can make bad use of it, but this use is extra genus notitiae. By its nature science is in itself an end honestum. Works of art on the contrary are not in themselves an end. The creative universe, work of the divine art is ordered essentially to God.

For works of human art see II Phy. ch.2, 194a 32; lect.4 n.8.

Man can attain to a very great perfection in the arts ordered to himself, eg. technical mechanics; he can rejoice in the perfection of his speech, he can consider the perfection of the expression of himself as an end: he can use himself for himself.

Are the fine arts an exception to this rule of being ordered to something else? Not at all. They are willed for speculative knowledge, contemplation and in the measure that they are made only to be known they enter into the category of objects. It is not formally as works of art that they are beautiful but insofar as they have the nature of an object. Art imitates nature and in this respect it is turned towards nature. (If we take away arts ordination to the speculative and - III CC 25 - this leads logically towards a revolutionary conception of art and all human activity individua and social. Art having no more a stabled term its end will consist in a perpetual transformation in a dialectical play of position and of negation under pain of falling into the immobility of contemplation: as soon as an object is posed it would be necessary to negate it, for every object, as such, partakes of immobility.)

Human arts abide in a neutral field with respect to science and prudence. Because arts can be exploited for contrary ends (grammar to praise or blaspheme) man thinks he can dominate ends. The infinite possibilities of art make man believe that he is master of the infinite, can incite him to place all his hope in his practical intelligence, to wish to draw science and prudence into the same neutral domain as art.

(4) There is also the temptation of the hands, by which man realizes the greatest variety of concrete works. In III de anima, c.8, Aristotle compares intelligence to the hand. cf. also I, q.76, a.5, ad 4; q. 91, a.3, ad 2. The hand is the organ the most significative of intelligence (practical); it participates in its infinity. History shows that when man turns from speculation and its transcendent object, he ends by adoring the works of his hands.

C O P Y

(5) Let us now examine the proposition or axiom: *malum ut in pluribus in specie humana*. We read this in the fragments of Heraclitus: "For what thought or what wisdom have they? They follow the poets and take the crowd for master, not knowing that there are many evil and few good. For even the best of them choose one thing above all others, immortal glory among mortals, whereas the majority revel in food like beasts.Bias said: the majority of men are bad..."

Following Aristotle, S Thomas maintains the same idea in theology: cf. I, q. 23, a. 7 ad 3; q. 49, a. 3 ad 5; q. 63, a. 9 ad 1; I-II, q. 71, a. 2 ad 3. See also JSTH, Curs. Theol., T.I, p. 322, col. b; T.III, p. 569 et seq.

This state of things is not only with regard to supernatural life. The majority of men refuse *res intelligibiles* even in the purely natural order. And this refusal even of the natural object is not due to the present state of humanity, it is not only due to original sin: in his commentary on the Sentences (I, d. 39, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4) S Thomas estimates this purely natural attitude. He touches here the profound reason of this delusion which accords absolute primacy to art; why man can believe himself as creator with regard to the entirety of being: *ipsa natura humana in se considerata aequaliter se habet indifferenter ad omnia vel intelligenda vel facienda*.

We have seen that being the object of our intelligence is both what is most determined (there is no mean between being and non-being) being is opposed to non-being as to the impossible) and what is most indetermined: who says being says all and nothing: being is said of everything save nothing which is its contradictory.

We have also seen that this indetermination of being as it is presented to us is only a reflection of the original indetermination of our intelligence. The indetermination of being is not a real indetermination. (There exist some real indeterminations: the positive indetermination of liberty, the negative indetermination of prime matter. But being envisaged purely as such is neither liberty or pure potentiality.)

This paradoxical character of the object of our intelligence, and the fact of attributing to being the potentiality of our intelligence sufficiently explains how we can be led to consider the entirety of being as malleable, as a *factibile*, as a matter of art, as a plasticity which liberty dominates.

(Remark: In the I, q. 71, a. 2 ad 3, saint Thomas seems to see a certain natural conflict between the rational and sensible. But in another text, we should not also: I. q. 49, q. 3, ad 5)

We should not yet conclude that there exists a natural conflict between the sensible and rational, at least in understanding "natural" in a purely material sense as designating what happens in the majority of cases. In fact this conflict is purely accidental, even

C O P Y

if it makes itself felt in the majority of cases. Nature does not tend toward this conflict: lll CG 6. If we take the term "natural" in its rigorous sense, there cannot be question of a conflict under pain of falling into manicheism and jansenism. Whereas, if we take the term in its large sense we can say that naturally the majority does not succeed in imposing reason on the sensible. It is in this sense that saint Thomas says that men are naturally mediocre, pusillanimous, parcimonious, etc.: cf. IV Eth., lect.5.

(6) In fact, man succeeds better in the domain of art than in that of prudence: *In voluntariis autem magis videtur malum esse ut in pluribus quantum ad agibilia, licet non quantum ad factibilia, in quantum ars non deficit nisi ut in paucioribus, imitatur enim naturam.* (de pot. q.3, a.6 ad 5)

Good artisans are more numerous than good men. It is natural enough that man tries to reduce all to art. That is what Descartes tried do with philosophy, to make a philosophy for the man in the street; a philosophy whose end did not consist in knowing things for the sake of knowing them, but which could be used: cf. Discourse on Method, 3th part: "... in place of that speculative philosophy which is taught in the schools..." One easily sees how marxism, radicalism, is a logical end of this very mediocre position.

The rational creature is not naturally ordered to supernatural beatitude which consists in the immediate vision of the divine essence. For this grace is necessary, a gratuitous gift. From the beginning the angels were constituted in the state of grace (*gratia gratum faciens*) - I, q.62, a.3. This grace does not give to them beatitude itself, being only a *principium merendi*: then it would be necessary to turn toward God, to receive the perfect grace *principium fruendi* - *ibid.* a.4.

But remark that the object of beatitude holds in the line of pure objectivity: the immediate vision of the object the most pure which is the divine essence. Grace the principle of beatitude, absolutely gratuitous gift, hold again in the line of objectivity: it asks submission as to an object: one receives it, one does not need (exige) it.

The fallen angel desired this beatitude but he wished to give it by himself: he wished to see God, to be like God, without help from God. I, q.63, a.3. The sin consisted in the refusal of the object in its pure objectivity. Not that the fallen angel wished to construct the object of beatitude: he even desired to see God as He is in himself: but he did not wish to submit to the preambles of attaining this object: he wished himself to be the cause of this elevation: he wanted to have in himself the principle of his beatitude. He wished to be himself the practical cause of his beatitude.

The angel cannot err in the natural order. But there is in him the obediencial potency whose limits he cannot know: if he could

C O P Y

have known the possibilities offered by this potency of which God alone is the master, he would exhaust this obediential potency, he would see already all it can give. We understand consequently how this potency can be presented to him as a domain of adventure. Ignorant in this domain, not knowing the limits and the implications of this potency, he tried to use himself this obediential potency by pride.

Man can err because of the natural potentiality of his intelligence as of matter and because of his obediential potency. The angel can only err because of his potentiality with respect to the supernatural order, because of his obediential potency.

There exists a profound analogy between the dilemma of the being object of our intelligence, and the dilemma constituted by the natural potency and the obediential potency.

For us even in the natural order to be or not to be that is the question; for the angel on the contrary the only question is to be more. As John of S Thomas says: *natura perfecta qualis est angelica non movetur ad peccatum per defectum sed per excessum.* C Theol, T IV, p. 935, col b)

Thus the true cause of the multiplicity of philosophies is, like the sin of Adam and the angels, a sin of pride which consists in refusing the essential conditions of the object, to wish to elevate our potentiality as potentiality. Modern philosophy wishes to make its object.

Practical and speculative art: Let us say several words on the distinction to be made between practical and speculative art. Art is in itself practical: *recta ratio factibilium*. The divine art is creator of contingent things, creation is nothing else but a work of divine art. Divine art is characterized by this: it presupposes absolutely no subject. Created art, on the contrary, supposes a determinable subject which implies a certain plasticity.

The determinability of the subject presupposed by created art can be considered in two ways. One can envisage it as that which is related to the perfection of the artist so that he can express himself by simple superabundance, like a painter who makes a picture. This serves for nothing but to be seen. In the second place, one can consider this determinability as founded properly in the potentiality of the nature. You know that if nature was absolutely determined it would be impossible to work the matter, to make a house. For the natural forms would resist and would be so determined that one could in no wise suppress it, it could not cede to our pressure, before our activity. Therefore it is necessary to pose a certain determinability from the side of the subjects on which art operates, a plasticity which is possible only in the measure that natural forms can receive our activity. ~~In~~ This determinability of matter is

C O P Y

founded on the imperfection of the nature, on the fact that it can be determined further, that fact that the form is in a certain respect corruptible. When one considers this determinability formally as an imperfection of nature that is, as an insufficient determination, art can serve to bring this nature to determination. Which belongs to it as nature, that is, art can cooperate with nature so that nature might be constituted in its natural state in a more determined fashion than it is by itself. For example, medicine, the end of medicine is not a work of art, its end is nature - the perfection of nature. This is a distinction between pure art and the art which cooperates with nature.

This last potentiality is also characteristic of the human intelligence whose operation is perfectable by art, that is by artificial logic. Logic can introduce determinations into the intelligence which render discourse easier. Consequently, one can find an art even in the domain of speculative intelligence, and in this respect there will be a speculative art distinct from art properly so called. Cf. I post. anal. 1 nn. 1-3.

What characterises intelligence is the fact that it can reflect on itself on its proper activities, and can direct them. Reason can direct not only the activities of the other faculties inferior to reason, it can also direct itself. Logic, because it directs the very operation of reason and because reason is the principle of all other arts, will be the art of arts for it directs that which directs in all the other arts. On liberal arts Cf. I - II q.57, art.3, ad 3.

The fact of constructing a syllogism is a work that one executes; the fact of counting or of measuring, all this implies a certain operation of art. The art which remains absolutely within the speculative intelligence, which is submitted to nothing will be liberal in the highest degree. It will not only liberal but purely and simply speculative. IIa IIae, q.47, art.2, ad3. S. Thomas calls logic a speculative art; if it were a practical art we would immediately be in idealism.

Logic is both a science since it is demonstrative and deduces conclusion and an art since it directs activity. It is a speculative art since it directs an activity which is essentially ordered to and it remains within the speculative order.

	speculative: logic, math
Liberal	
	practical: fine arts, in conception
<u>Art</u>	
	liberal by participation (playing a piece of music)
Mechanical	
	servile (making bricks)

Cf. J of S Thomas, C. Theol. VI, pg.474

COPY

Today this order is completely reversed in Marxism which says that the most noble form of art is servile art, and the other arts are simply road ways to this art that speculation belongs to an infantile age of the human intelligence and is a malady of the mind. The fine arts are cultivated to develop more technical ability. The liberal art by participation is already in the category of mechanical arts.

Logic and Philosophy

Since experimental sciences belong to dialectics which is logic, it is fitting to insist at the outset on the manner in which logic is distinguished from philosophy.

The first principle is the principle of contradiction ie. it implies an opposition of contradiction of being and nothing, this is quite evident. Everyone agrees even if someone claims not to: it is impossible to be and not to be at the same time and in the same respect. This principle is so evident that it is believed to be useless to insist on it, but if one abandons it too quickly one falls into confusion. The first thing this principle tells us when we envisage it in itself is that there exists an object of thought which cannot be: nothing which is the impossible. It is impossible that nothing exists, nothing is the impossibility of being. Yet we think it, we say the impossible. If we could not know the impossible we could not understand that being is not the impossible, we could not distinguish the necessary from the possible and the possible from the impossible. It is an object for thought alone. That is why we say that the distinction between the being of reason and the being of nature, between the real and logical orders is immediately founded on the principle of contradiction. There exists two species of beings real being and the being of reason. Cf. S. Thomas on the Meta. book 4 lesson 4 n.574.

As being extends to all things there is a coextensiveness between logical being and real being. There is coextensiveness since to think being we have need of an intention in reason which ought to have the amplitude of the object designated. Therefore there is perfect coextensiveness between the being of logic and the being of metaphysics, but there is this difference between the two, that one is purely of reason, and can only exist in reason and that the other is real.

Cf. I, Eth. lesson 1, n.1. On orders. We must distinguish the doctrine of logic from its use. One can consider logic as a science which demonstrates certain conclusions which regard the logical order. It is a science it demonstrates with rigor, it is certain knowledge to causes. But logic does not constitute in itself an end it should serve to direct the activity of reason in the other sciences. One does not put order in concepts simply for the order of the concepts as if they were objects to be considered for themselves. Logic cannot be a speculative science which terminates in itself as a last end, but should be ordered to the other speculative sciences. Cf. I meta.3, n.57; De Trin. q.5, a.1, ad 2

COPY

In the measure that logic is engaged in the other speculative sciences it is called utens as opposed to docens. It is called docens logic insofar as it features scientifically the rules for directing the intellect; utens when it brings them to execution in this or that matter. J. of S. Thomas. Insofar as usage logic is engaged in the deduction proper to the other sciences for example when I make a deduction in the phil. of nature, it must be logical. But in this case the conclusion I arrive at is not a logical truth: it concerns a being of nature and not a being of reason.

From logic considered as doctrine one can deduce absolutely nothing concerning the being of nature for if one could deduce real truths in going from the logical order considered formally as logical therefore as separating, one could deduce real being from the being of reason. Consequently it would follow that one could deduce being from nothing as Hegel did. This comes down to deducing the necessary from the impossible. Cf. S. Thomas I, Post. anal. lesson 20, m15

Demonstrative logic and Dialectical logic

The first is purely and simply scientific and proceeds by way of rigorous demonstrations. This logic attaches itself (se rattache) to the principle of contradiction which enunciates the absolute opposition of being and non-being.

But there exists several species of non-being. Up til now we have considered only absolute non-being which is opposed to being as such. But it is in negating being that one obtains non-being, but negation can be either absolute or relative, as is defined in the IV Meta. lesson 3, n.565.

C O P Y